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ARTHURM. BISTLINE
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(208) 665-7270
(208) 665-7290 (fax)
abistline@povn.com
ISB: 5216
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BREMER, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, and KGG PARTNERSHIP,
Appellant/Plaintiff,

Supreme Court Docket: 39942-2012
Kootenai County Case No. CVI 1-1921

vs.
EAST GREENACRES IRRIGATION
DISTRICT,

APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

Respondent/Defendants.

1.

The Court should darifv the law pertaining to what steps a landowner must take to
preserve its :right to challenge an illegal condition of approval.
This case is about a private landowner challenging a condition required to approve

development of its property after the landowner had already agreed to the condition in an effort
to reasonably mitigate the landowners potential damages. KMST. LLC v. County o{Ada, 138
Idaho 577, 67 P3.rd 56 (2003) and Buckskin Properties. Inc. v. Valley Cnty., 154 Idaho 486, 492,
300 P.3d 18(2013) are cases involving the same issue. In KAfST, the landowner proposed the
condition without any input from the regulatory body. Id at 582, 61. In Buckskin, the regulatory
body required the condition, as it did in this case, but the landowner raised no objection.
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There is no evidence in the record indicating that Buckskin was
strong-armed into signing the CCA or RDA; that it voiced any
objection to anyone, at any time, to making the payment required
under either agreement; or that it did not, as the County avers,
benefit from the agreement by virtue of the road improvements
facilitated by its payments.
Buckskin Properties. Inc. v.
Valley Cnty., 154 Idaho 486,
492, 300 P.3d 18, 24 (2013).
In this case, however, the landovvner raised objection as specifically found by this Court.
"Schlotthauer then met with Ron Wilson, EGID's manager. Wilson told Schlotthauer that
Bremer would not get water until they agreed to build the extension, citing EGID's by-laws as
the legal authority." (Opinion at 2) "Schlotthauer then advised Bremer that although the
extension may be illegal, the costs to the business meant the 'only logical course was to
capitulate to the demand, and then institute suit after the fact."' (Opinion at 3)
So the real issue is whether or not a landowner who decides to capitulate rather than
litigate can recoup the cost of an illegal condition later. This is the question in the footnote from
the KMST case and it is vitally important that the Idaho Bar understand the answer to that
question.
We express no opinion as to whether a developer who contends
that a condition of approval amounts to an unconstitutional taking
of property must litigate that issue before proceeding with the
development.
KMST. LLC v. Cnty. o[Ada,
138 Idaho 577, 582, 67 P.3d
56, 61 (2003).
The language of the Court's opinion seems to indicate that the answer to the question is
"no", the landowner cannot agree to an illegal condition and later try to recoup the cost. "The
attorney felt the requirement was illegal, but advised that the 'logical course' was to build the
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extension anyway given the money invested and the time it would take to litigate. This is yet
another indication that Bremer chose to build the extension." (Opinion at 6)
If the Court is saying that a landowner cannot accede to an illegal condition of approval
imposed upon it and then later try to recoup the costs, then this Court should be clear as the
holding has huge implications for private landowners wishing to develop their property. In this
case, Bremer's only other option would have been to file suit at the inception of the requested
condition and be faced with the lack of water to its production facility for an indefinite time possibly for the same amount of time this litigation has taken which has been years. Such a
ruling will permit regulatory bodies to bully private landowners, allowing them to cross the
limits of Constitutionality when imposing conditions, comfortable in the knowledge that unless
what they are requiring is way out of line, odds are, the private landowner will simply have to
surrender. Most land developers do not have the ability to wait out a two or three year lawsuit to
finish a project.
If the Court is not saying that landowners are required to file suit when faced with an
illegal condition of improvement, then the Comi should provide guidance on what is required of
a private landowner in order to preserve their rights when faced with an illegal condition of
improvement. Here, as this Court found, it is clear that Bremer objected to the condition, but
was not enough to take Bremer out of the confines of the Buckskin case. This Court should
announce a rule setting forth how a landowner can preserve its rights when it is forced to accede
to an illegal condition of improvement. A rule requiring written notice that the condition is
agreed to under protest may be an example of such rue. This would put the regulatory body on
notice that it may get the condition it wants now, but may have to pay for it later.
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2.

If this Court is ruling that EGID had the authority to impose this agreement on
Bremer, then it should reconsider that decision as a material question of fact exists
pertaining to that issue.

As found by this Comi, "Wilson told Schlotthauer that Bremer would not get water until
they agreed to build the extension, citing EGID's by-laws as the legal authority." (Opinion at 2)
If EGID had the legal ability to force Bremer to construct the extension, or could have

constructed it itself and given Bremer the bill, then it is of no consequence to Bremer that EGID
threatened to withhold water.
However, limits exist on a regulatory body's ability to impose conditions to approve
private landowners' uses of their property.
Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions,"
the government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the
benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 385, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2317, 129 L. Ed. 2d
304 (1994).
EGID forced Bremer, under threat of not providing water, to agree to its demands. Some limit
must exist on EGID's power to force such an agreement; otherwise, EGID could extract
whatever it requested from any landowner anytime a landowner wanted to utilize EGID's
system. In this case, in order for LC. 43-330A to be read as Constitutional, some limit to EGID's
ability to require an agreement pursuant to that statute must exist. The limit is this case is in the
statute itself. The statute conveys that the system installed must be for " ... the proper distribution
of irrigation water." LC.§ 43-330A (West).
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In this case, a water distribution system already existed and conflicting evidence existed
on summary judgment pertaining to whether that system provided proper distribution of water to
Bremer's parcel. (R. at 145,4111) This Court found that the system required of Bremer was
necessary for fire flow purposes (Opinion at 11 ), but acknowledges that evidence was in the
record that proved the existing system on Bremer' s property was sufficient for fire flow
purposes. "Bremer later submitted Bob Skelton's affidavit, which stated that Bremer's fire
suppression system did not require an extension from Hayden Avenue." (Opinion at 4) This
creates a question of fact and it was not proper for it to be resolved in EGID' s favor on summary
judgment.

CONCLUSION
The subject matter of this appeal is of great importance to private landowners. This
Court should clarify its ruling regarding the steps a private landowner must take to preserve its
rights to challenge an illegal condition of approval that has been imposed upon it.
If the ruling rests on EGID's statutory right to impose this agreement on Bremer, a
material question of fact exists on that issue and summary judgment was not proper.

DATED this 21 5tday of January, 2014.

ARTHURM. BISTLINE
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the
following APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEAIRNG by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
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